2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

8-6-2015

Xi Li v. Attorney General United States

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015

Recommended Citation
"Xi Li v. Attorney General United States" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 834.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/834

This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 14-1536
_____________
XI QUE LI,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
_____________
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A076-506-646)
Immigration Judge: Donald V. Ferlise
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 12, 2015
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: August 6, 2015)
_________
OPINION*
_________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

McKEE, Chief Judge.
Petitioner Xi Que Li filed a petition for review of the February 10, 2014 decision
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) denying her motion to reopen.
For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the Board’s decision and remand for
proceedings consistent with this decision.
I.
Li is a native of China who entered the United States without proper
documentation in August of 2000. After being placed in removal proceedings, Li filed an
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). Li’s initial application was based on her claim that she was forced to
undergo an abortion in accordance with China’s family planning policy. Immigration
Judge Donald V. Ferlise denied the application and ordered her removal. The BIA
affirmed the IJ’s decision. In 2007, Li filed a motion to reopen proceedings based on
changed country conditions, based on China’s family planning policy, which was denied
by the BIA. Li petitioned this Court for review, and we granted the petition and
remanded it to the BIA for further proceedings. The BIA ultimately denied that motion.
On November 8, 2013, Li filed a second motion to reopen proceedings. This
motion was also based on a claim of changed country conditions, but it rested on Li’s
conversion to Christianity and the alleged intensification of China’s persecution of
Christians. The BIA denied the motion on February 10, 2014, declaring it untimely and
finding that Li failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for at least some types
of the relief she sought. Li again petitioned this Court for review.
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II.1
Though a motion to reopen must generally be filed with the BIA no later than 90
days after the entry of the final administrative decision, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), this
deadline does not apply to motions based on “changed country conditions arising in the
country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would
not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” Id. §
1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2008).
However, even if the petitioner overcomes this “threshold” issue of demonstrating
timeliness by presenting sufficient evidence of changed country circumstances, the BIA
may still deny the motion to reopen if the movant fails to establish a prima facie case for
the relief sought. Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 2007). “[T]he prima
facie case standard for a motion to reopen . . . requires the applicant to produce objective
evidence showing a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that he can establish [that he is entitled to
relief].” Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 563 (3d Cir. 2004) (ellipsis and second alteration
in original) (quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002)).
We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Pllumi v. Att’y
Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011). The BIA abuses its discretion if it acts in a
manner that is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241,
251 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 174) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Though our standard of review is a deferential one, we must be satisfied that the Board

The BIA had jurisdiction to review Li’s motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2, and
we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
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has “followed proper procedures and considered and appraised the material evidence
before it.” Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 177 (quoting Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 583 (3d Cir.
1994)).
The BIA must “meaningfully consider[]” the evidence and arguments presented
by the alien in considering the motion. Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 268, 272 (3d Cir.
2014). “To fulfill this requirement, the BIA must provide an indication that it considered
such evidence, and if the evidence is rejected, an explanation as to why it was rejected.”
Id. “This does not mean that the BIA is required to expressly parse each point or discuss
each piece of evidence presented, but ‘it may not ignore evidence favorable to the alien.’”
Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir.
2010)). Thus, when dismissing the petitioner’s evidence, “the BIA should provide us
with more than cursory, summary or conclusory statements, so that we are able to discern
its reasons for declining to afford relief to a petitioner.” Zheng, 549 F.3d at 268 (citation
omitted).
III.
The BIA declared Li’s motion untimely because it found “that the evidence
regarding past and current conditions faced by Christians in China is not sufficient to
demonstrate a material change since the time of the respondent’s hearing in 2004.” (J.A.
4.) The Board’s explanation for this finding was that “[t]he evidence reflects that China
continues to allow the practice of Christianity, although there have been reports of the
detention of some leaders of underground, or ‘house,’ churches and harassment of church
members.” (Id.) It then listed a string of citations to sections of the U.S. government
4

reports and publications proffered by Li, noting that it “ha[s] found that U.S. State
Department reports on country conditions are highly probative evidence and are usually
the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations.” (Id.) This explanation,
which does nothing to actually explain the Board’s reasoning, is the type of “conclusory”
analysis that makes it difficult for us to review the Board’s decision. See Zheng, 549
F.3d at 268.
For example, after reviewing the BIA’s opinion, we are able to identify the
evidence the BIA relied upon in arriving at its conclusion, but we cannot discern why it
credited that evidence and why it apparently failed to credit other sources. The Board’s
only explanation was a general statement that it has repeatedly noted that U.S. State
Department reports are “usually the best” evidence when considering whether to grant a
motion to reopen based on changed country conditions. (J.A. 4.) However, the Board
did not explain why it only cited to eight U.S. governmental reports, half of which were
not produced by the State Department, to support its conclusion in this case. (J.A. 5962.) See Shardar, 503 F.3d at 316 (noting that, because the Board did not provide “any
explanation for why [the petitioner] failed to overcome the ‘temporal limitations’ in the
regulations given the evidence he presented, the Board’s conclusory handling of this
issue [in that case] was an abuse of discretion”).2 Though the BIA may analyze the
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The BIA also notes that Li failed to attach certain pieces of evidence on which she
relied in her motion, including reports describing conditions during the time period when
Li initially sought asylum in 2004. Though the Government argues that Li’s failure to
attach these documents prevented Li from making a showing regarding the country
conditions in 2004, the Board itself did not articulate this reasoning or otherwise explain
how—or if—the omission of the documents was relevant to its decision.
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record in a “summary” fashion without citing to each piece of evidence, the opinion as a
whole must demonstrate “that the BIA reviewed the record and . . . why the record
supports its conclusion.” Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 499 (3d Cir. 2012). The
opinion here does not satisfy either requirement.
Perhaps most critically, in addition to failing to explain why it credited certain
evidence, the BIA neglected to explain why it chose not to credit the evidence that was
favorable to Li. See Zhu, 744 F.3d at 272 (requiring an explanation as to why rejected
evidence was rejected). Indeed, the Board did not even mention the three lengthy NGO
reports, five sources reporting on persecution or harassment in Li’s native Fujian
Province, sixteen news articles, or various other pieces of evidence that Li attached to her
motion. Some of this evidence arguably supported Li’s claim that persecution and
harassment of Christians practicing in “house churches” had significantly worsened since
2004. For example, the ChinaAid 2011 Annual Report claimed that “the overall situation
of persecution [of Christians] can be statistically represented as being 42.5% worse than
in 2010, 63.7% worse than in 2009, 95% worse than in 2008, 261% worse than in 2007
and 318.1% worse than in 2006.” (J.A. 253.) Similarly, a New York Times article
explains that, “[a]fter years of tolerance by the country’s religious authorities,
unregistered churches have been facing increased pressure to either disband or join the
system of state-controlled congregations.” (J.A. 342). As noted, the BIA must
“meaningfully consider[]” the petitioner’s evidence, but it need not explicitly name and
analyze every piece of that evidence. Zhu, 744 F.3d at 272. However, it is certainly an
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abuse of discretion where, as here, the Board “fail[s] to discuss most of the evidentiary
record.” Zheng, 549 F.3d at 271.
We recognize that, even if a motion to reopen is timely filed, the BIA may deny
the motion for various other reasons, including the movant’s failure to establish a prima
facie case for the relief sought. See Shardar, 503 F.3d at 313. In this case, however, the
BIA’s analysis of Li’s eligibility for the relief sought suffers from the same infirmities as
its analysis of the timeliness issue. Indeed, as the Government acknowledges, it is not
even clear whether the BIA reached the question of whether Li had shown a prima facie
case of eligibility for asylum. It did not do so explicitly, though it did comment that Li
had not shown that “she will likely suffer mistreatment amounting to persecution.” (J.A.
4.) Given the BIA’s terse statements with regards to Li’s eligibility for relief, it is not
only impossible for us to review its conclusions—it is difficult to discern if it even made
a conclusion.
Though we proceed cautiously in disturbing the BIA’s discretionary ruling on a
motion to reopen, we are nevertheless mindful of our appellate function. We must be
able to review the reasoning supporting the BIA’s factual and legal conclusions and
determine if it supports the BIA’s decision. The BIA’s opinion here does not allow us to
do that. Accordingly, we will vacate the BIA’s decision denying Li’s motion to reopen.
However, in holding that the Board abused its discretion in failing to provide sufficient
reasoning for its decision, we do not comment substantively on any of the issues in this
case.
IV.
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For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the BIA’s order and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.
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